This paper presents an analysis of exposure to a hazmat accident during transportation within an urban environment. We suggest a set of accidents which could really happen inside the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City, based on information about recent real hazmat accidents in Mexico. Then, we obtain exposure areas for such accidents and calculate the number of exposed inhabitants and travellers who would need to be evacuated in case of a hazmat accident during transportation. Then, we compare real versus recommended evacuation areas and exposed people, and discuss whether such evacuation or sheltered-in-places, in the recommended time is really possible.
Introduction
This paper includes five sections. The first one cites interesting papers on hazardous materials (hazardous materials) accidents. An introduction to evacuation areas in case of a hazmat accident is presented in Section Two. A set of real hazmat transportation accidents is described in the third section, and the modelling of a set of supposed hazmat transportation accidents in the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City (MZMC) is presented in Section Four. Then, exposed inhabitants and travellers to be evacuated are presented in Section Five, which also includes a discussion about the evacuation feasibility. Finally, a conclusion and references are presented.
The literature contains many works on hazmat transportation. Erkut et al. (2007) elaborate an extensive analysis of the literature with the following classification: risk assessment, routing, combined facility location and routing, and network design.
Some recent papers on hazmat transportation are related to accident probability. Qiao et al. (2009) analyze databases and apply expert knowledge to propose a model for the estimation of hazardous material transportation accident frequency, and Ronza et al. (2007) analyse databases to propose ignition and explosion probabilities as a function of the amount and the substance spilled.
Other studies are focused on modelling the impact area. Bertik et al. (2008) analyze different methods for modelling the release and dispersion of dangerous gases or vapours in cases of major accidents from rail transportation in urban areas.
There are interesting papers related to the health of the population and evacuation. Ronza et al. (2009) proposed a procedure to estimate the cost of damages suffered by people, equipment and environment in port areas, establishing a method by which the number of people killed, injured and evacuated can be predicted. Damage to people is calculated based on population density. Georgiadou et al. (2007) propose an ideal model to represent the population evacuation around a major hazard facility by means a Markov process. Bermana et al. (2007) presented a methodology to determine the optimal design of a specialised team network in order to maximise its ability to respond to such incidents in a region.
These papers are not related to an urban environment, nor do they consider real important urban elements such as people caught in congestion.
We analyze, based on information from real accidents, population exposure in the case of hazmat transportation accidents in congested urban areas. Since hazardous materials are commonly transported within urban areas in Mexico, hazmat transportation accidents happen, sometimes producing evacuations and/or injuring people.
Evacuation Areas
First responders use the 2008 Emergency Response Guidebook, ERG2008, which is defined as, "a guide to aid first responders in quickly identifying the specific or generic hazards of the material(s) involved in the incident and protecting themselves and the general public during the initial response phase of the incident" (USDOT, 2008). The Emergency Transportation System for the Chemical Industry (SETIQ), a service of the National Association of Chemical Industries, receives emergency calls and provides communication links with fire fighters, Red Cross, police, public safety agencies, emergency services and appropriate industrial assistance groups (including the hazmat shipper).
ERG2008 suggests an isolation area as an immediate precautionary measure (irrespectively of the quantity involved) and an evacuation perimeter for spillage and fire situations. Moreover, for hazardous materials which are toxic by inhalation (TIH), initial isolation and protective action distances are suggested to protect people from vapours resulting from hazmat spills. People in these areas must be evacuated and/or sheltered inside buildings. "However, the choice of evacuation and/or sheltered in-place depends on a number of factors related to dangerous goods, population threatened and weather conditions. Some of the population factors are the following: location, number of people, time available to evacuate or shelter in-place, ability to control evacuation or shelter in-place, building types and availability, special institutions or populations, e.g., nursing homes, hospitals, prisons" (USDOT, 2008) . Sorenser et al. (2004) examined the components of the protective action decision process and describe steps that should be taken in a planning context to prepare for efficient decision making during an emergency.
The initial isolation and protective action distances are areas likely to be affected during the first 30 minutes after materials are spilled and could increase with time (USDOT, 2008), i.e. evacuation or sheltering-in-place must be carried out in a hurry.
In an urban environment, however, a number of people could be within the previously defined areas, including people in buildings and persons on the street, i.e. pedestrians and persons in cars, buses and trucks, trapped in the traffic jam produced by the accident.
Congestion prevents emergency services from arriving rapidly at the accident place, which implies that evacuation is not performed in time and many curious people approach the accident place (Lozano et al., 2009) .
It has sometimes happened in Mexico that evacuation or sheltered-in-place procedures were carried out late, as much as three hours after the accident. Lozano et al. (2009) describe the case of a trichloro-s-triazinetrone accident that happened last year at the port of Veracruz, Mexico.
Real Hazmat Transportation Accidents
We have chosen a sample of six real hazmat transportation accidents in Mexico whose consequences were or could have been very severe (see Table 1 ). Five of them happened in urban areas, four within the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City and one in Veracruz City. Three accidents produced toxic gases, two produced fires, and the other (involving trichloro-s-triazinetrione) produced fire and a toxic cloud. Four accidents occurred on the path and the other two, at origins or destinations. The involved hazardous materials correspond to four gases (chlorine, ammonia, ethylene oxide and liquefied petroleum gas), a liquid (kerosene) and a solid (trichloro-s-triazinetrone, dry). Table 1 presents information about the chosen accidents. The first five columns present the name and quantity of the involved hazmat and real consequences, place and date of the accident. The sixth and seventh columns present ID and Guide numbers according to the ERG2008. Columns eight to ten present initial isolation and protective action areas in case of a large spill (greater than 200 litres for liquids or 300kg for solids) (USDOT, 2008) ; all of the chosen accidents involved very large quantities of hazardous materials. Finally, the last two columns present initial isolation and evacuation areas in case of fire (USDOT, 2008) .
Since ammonia, chlorine and ethylene oxide are toxic by inhalation hazardous materials (TIH), suggested initial isolation and protective action distances, in case of a large spill, are given.
In the daytime, five of the accidents evacuation areas are larger in case of fire than in case of a large spill, i.e. an explosion is the most dangerous; at night-time, two of such accidents have larger evacuation areas in case of a large spill than in case of fire, i.e. the toxic cloud is more dangerous.
In the case of chlorine, the impact due to a large spill is always greater than the impact due to fire. Trichloro-s-triazinetrone (dry) is not flammable except when heated by an outside source to temperatures above 240 C or when it is contaminated with moisture, organic matter or other chemicals; then the hazmat may start a chemical reaction with the generation of heat, the liberation of hazardous gases and the possible generation of fire and explosion. Thermal decomposition or combustion produces chlorine, nitrogen, nitrogen trichloride, cyanogen chloride, oxides of carbon and phosgene; wet material may generate nitrogen trichloride, thus producing an explosion hazard; contact with water slowly liberates irritating and hazardous chlorine containing gases (NYSE:OXY, 2008).
Modelling of Hazmat Transportation Accidents
We recreated the six accidents shown in Table 1 , considering the true date and time of each actual accident, hence real atmospheric conditions, wind direction and wind speed. All of accidents happened during the daytime.
The release sizes were adjusted according to the size of the truck-tanks and containers which usually transport such hazardous materials.
Real and supposed points of hazmat accidents are shown in Figure 1 . All of them are located on main streets. Note that the majority of them are in the outskirts of the MZMC, where inhabitant density is high (the total inhabitants within the MZMC is over 20 million).
For those accidents that occurred on a street inside the MZMC, real accidents points were considered, except in case of kerosene where a point on the path was chosen because the exact place of the accident was unknown.
Liquefied petroleum gas accident happened within a distribution centre; hence, we located the supposed accident point on one of the physical distribution paths.
Ammonia and trichloro-s-triazinetrone accidents happened outside of the MZMC; hence, we chose feasible points along the paths of these hazardous materials within the MZMC, where an accident could happen.
The real ammonia and ethylene oxide accidents generated spillages; hence we modelled them as spills. The real chorine accident did not produce a spill or fire because the tank was not broken; nevertheless, we supposed that the tank was broken and a spill was produced.
The real kerosene accident generated a spill and involved the risk of explosion; we supposed that there was an explosion. The real liquefied petroleum gas accident produced an explosion and fire with multiple truck-tanks; we supposed that just one truck tank exploded. The real trichloro-s-triazinetrone (dry) accident produced a fire and a cloud of toxic gases; we merely considered the fire. Therefore, except for liquefied petroleum gas and trichloro-striazinetrone, the supposed hazmat accidents would have worse consequences than the real cases. For spills, we obtained three impact areas with different toxicity levels by means of dispersion models (USEPA, 2007) . Ammonia and chlorine were modelled by means a Gaussian Plume for heavy gases because the chemical escapes as a mixture of gas and aerosol. Ethylene oxide was also modelled by means of a Gaussian Plume because the chemical escapes as a liquid and forms an evaporating puddle.
For explosion and fire, we obtained three concentric circles of danger with different thermal radiation (kw/sqm). The thermal radiation's effects on people depend on the exposure time to a specific thermal radiation level; long exposure, even at a lower thermal radiation level, can produce serious physiological effects. A Thermal Radiation Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold for the level of thermal radiation, usually the level where a hazard may exist (USEPA, 2007) .
For liquefied petroleum gas, three concentric circles of danger were generated because the chemical escapes from the tank and burns like a jet fire. The impact area of the kerosene accident was obtained by using two independent circles of danger, respectively for a large spill and fire (vapour); the dimensions of the circles correspond to the ERG 2008 recommendations. Besides, the impact area of the trichloro-s-triazinetrone accident was obtained by using two independent circles of danger; however, poisonous gases produced by fire were not modelled. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the impact areas for the supposed accidents. The traces of Figure 2 represent thresholds with different toxicity levels (ammonia, chlorine and ethylene oxide) or thermal radiation level (liquefied petroleum gas). Evacuation must cover the three trace areas (two areas in case of the ethylene oxide accident).
On the other hand, the circles in Figure 3 represent the impact areas for a spill and fire, respectively. Evacuation must cover just the area of one of the circles, which depends on the accident type. In the next section, just the fire area is considered to calculate the population to be evacuated. Table 2 shows the distance from the source, the estimated concentration of the toxicity, and the area of each threat zone (impact area), for ammonia, chlorine and ethylene oxide accidents. While the areas measure some kilometres for ammonia and chlorine, the areas measure few metres for ethylene oxide Furthermore, the Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health concentrations (IDLH) are shown. IDLH refers to a concentration defined as the maximum exposure concentration of a given chemical from which one could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing symptoms or any irreversible health effects. Table 3 shows the radius of the circles of danger and the area of each threat zone for liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene and trichloro-s-triazinetrone. Potential health effects in each threat zone for each hazmat are shown in Table 4 . LOC1 Vapor is not irritating to eyes, nose or throat. If inhaled, it will cause dizziness, difficult breathing, or loss of consciousness. Liquid may cause frostbite. In case of fire, the thermal radiation is potentially lethal within 60 sec from jet fire. LOC2 LOC3
LOC1
Vapor causes slight irritation of eyes and nose. Liquid irritates stomach, if taken into lungs causes coughing, distress and a fast pulmonary edema. In case of fire, the thermal radiation is potentially lethal within 60 sec from jet fire. LOC2 The thermal radiation produces 2nd degree burns within 60 sec.
Inhalation causes sneezing and coughing. Contact with dust causes moderate irritation of eyes and itching and red skin. Ingestion causes burns of mouth and stomach. The thermal radiation is potentially lethal within 60 sec from jet fire. Non flammable. May cause fire on contact with combustibles. Poisonous gases are produced by fire. LOC2 The thermal radiation produces 2nd degree burns within 60 sec.
The thermal radiation produces 2nd degree burns within 60 sec. 
Persons to be Evacuated
A few studies in the literature consider exposed travellers (Lozano et al., 2009) . In an urban environment, with congested streets and arteries, a large number of people travel on the arcs of the network and could be exposed in case of a hazmat accident during transportation.
Therefore, in addition to exposed inhabitants, we consider exposed travellers, that is, people in cars, buses and trucks trapped in congestion during a hazmat transportation accident. We assume that travellers are the persons who would pass through a given arc of the main network (by car, bus or truck) for 15 minutes at rush hour.
The number of travellers on each arc of the main network was obtained on the basis of the results of a multimodal traffic assignment presented by Lozano et al. (2006 , who estimated the total number of vehicles and the number of cars, buses and trucks, on each arc of the main network at rush hour inside the MZMC. Regrettably, information about secondary and local streets is lacking; if such information were to be considered, the number of exposed travellers would be greater for each accident. Table 2 shows the number of exposed inhabitants and travellers, involved in accidents of ammonia, chlorine and ethylene oxide. Table 3 shows the number of exposed inhabitants and travellers, for accidents involving liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene and trichloro-s-triazinetrone (dry).
Travellers represent over 32% of the total exposure population for the ammonia accident. Its impact area includes an uninhabited area. For the chlorine accident, travellers constitute 15% of the total exposure. In both accidents, the number of exposed inhabitants greatly exceeds the number of exposed travellers. On the other hand, for the ethylene oxide accident, travellers represent 97% of the total exposure; this is so because the impact area is very small.
Travellers represent 55% of the total exposed population for the liquefied petroleum gas accident, 40% for the kerosene accident and 69% for the trichloro-s-triazinetrone accident. In these accidents, the number of travellers is fairly similar to the number of inhabitants.
The number of travellers to be evacuated is very important for all of the accidents; such importance could increase if instead of considering travellers in a span of 15 minutes, we consider travellers during 30 minutes. Fifteen minutes hardly seems enough time to start an evacuation.
The total number of people to be evacuated varies quite a bit, depending on the hazardous material involved in the accident. For the ammonia accident, 570 thousand people must be evacuated, and over 141 thousand of them could suffer permanent consequences to health or even die. For the chlorine accident, over 449 thousand people must be evacuated, and over 113 thousand of them could suffer permanent consequences to health or die. For the ethylene oxide accident only 663 people must be evacuated, and they possibly suffer just delayed nausea and vomiting.
The total number of people to be evacuated is not huge for the fire accidents. For the liquefied petroleum gas accident, nearly 40 thousand people must be evacuated, and over 1.7 thousand of them could suffer permanent injuries or even die. The number of persons who could suffer thermal radiation consequences is over 22 thousand for the kerosene accident and nearly 57 thousand for the trichloro-s-triazinetrone accident.
The results indicate that any ammonia or chlorine spill can easily require the evacuation (or sheltered-in-place) of over half a million of people, which is not feasible in just 30 minutes, particularly when a traffic jam is involved; even more so, evacuation of over 100 thousand people within the most toxic area could be very difficult in 30 minutes. Evacuation in the ethylene oxide accident however, is feasible in a short time.
For the liquefied petroleum gas accident, the 1.7 thousand people within the most dangerous area can be evacuated, but the total evacuation is unfeasible. Similarly for the kerosene and trichloro-s-triazinetrone accidents, total evacuation would not be feasible in time.
For trichloro-s-triazinetrione accidents, the evacuation area is relatively small in case of a fire; however though it is not a flammable or explosive material, in the case of heating by an external source, its combustion could generate an unknown quantity of chorine and other toxic gases. Therefore, many people could be injured or die even before the first responders arrive at the accident point.
In the real trichloro-s-triazinetrione accident at Veracruz City, one hour was required to evacuate 3.5 thousand people (Lozano et al., 2009 ). In the real ethylene oxide accident, 300 families were evacuated (approx. 1,500 persons); and in the kerosene accident, 150 families were evacuated (approx. 750 persons). However, regrettably, in the ammonia accident, all of the people within the impact area died; evacuation in time was impossible. Therefore, comparing the previous results versus the real facts, we obtain the following: i. In case of a large spill of ammonia or chlorine, a huge number of people could not be evacuated (or shelteredin-place) in time and could suffer permanent injuries to heath or die; ii. In case of an ethylene oxide large spill, total evacuation in time is possible; iii. In case of explosion and fire of liquefied petroleum gas or kerosene, just the evacuation of the most dangerous area could be possible in time, but then many persons could suffer thermal radiation consequences (2nd degree burns); iv. In case of explosion and fire of trichloro-s-triazinetrione, just the evacuation of the most dangerous area could be possible in time; even so, many persons could suffer thermal radiation consequences (2nd degree burns). In addition, an undetermined number of people could suffer chlorine and toxic gases effects and could be permanently injured or die; and Sheltered-in-places are not considered when there is risk of explosion and when people are within vehicles (cars, buses and trucks).
Conclusion
In practice, since some evacuations in Mexico have been slow and have started late, their effectiveness is uncertain. Within an evacuation area, the number of persons on the streets could be similar to the number of inhabitants. In the ERG2008 it is not clear how to evacuate people within vehicles on congested streets. Evacuations in urban areas are difficult due to the large number of persons, traffic congestion and the time available for evacuation, causing first responders to arrive late at the area with the higher level of toxicity, where people could die or be injured within 15 minutes of exposure.
Fortunately, an accident with very serious consequences has not yet happened; however, it could happen within the MZMC. Since the MZMC is a densely populated and congested area, with mixed land use, there is a feasible long-term solution, which is to relocate the destinations of the most dangerous hazardous materials (such as chorine and ammonia) out of the metropolis and prohibit vehicles from transporting such materials across urban areas.
